Article paru dans  Radikal le 26 01 2009

Traduction Louise Kiffer d’après la version anglaise.

L’année 2008 a été fertile en événements pour les relations arméno-turques. Le Président d’Arménie Serge Sarkissian a invité son homologue turc, Abullah Gül à se rendre en Arménie pour assister au match de football Arménie-Turquie pour la qualification de la Coupe du Monde. Les deux parties, arménienne et turque, ont donné chacune leur version des réunions préliminaires qui ont culminé avec l’acceptation de Gül à l’invitation quelques jours avant le Match. Le 6 septembre, l’avion de Gül s’est posé à Erevan, faisant de lui le premier président turc à visiter la capitale.

Lorsque Sarkissian pour la première fois a lancé l’invitation, les médias se mirent à qualifier le dialogue Turquie-Arménie de « Diplomatie Football ». L’échange de joueurs de ping-pong au début des années 1970 entre la Chine et les Etats Unis avait frayé la route pour la visite du Président Richard Nixon à Pékin en 1972, et avait été qualifié de « Diplomatie Ping-Pong ».

Les médias ont comparé les deux faits, mais la comparaison est plutôt superficielle. Alors qu’un tel terme pourrait convenir à un rapprochement entre deux grandes puissances telles que les USA et la Chine, une expression similaire pour la Turquie et l’Arménie est malencontreuse car elle assume qu’il y a une compétition au niveau des jeux. Or, il y a non seulement une asymétrie flagrante entre la Turquie et l’Arménie, mais ce pouvoir asymétrique est largement le résultat du génocide perpétré envers les Arméniens au cours de la Première Guerre Mondiale.

Ce qui m’amène à la campagne lancée par 200 intellectuels en Turquie le 15 décembre, présentant des excuses pour le Génocide arménien.

Les excuses disent : « Ma conscience n’accepte pas l’insensibilité envers le déni de la Grande Catastrophe à laquelle les Arméniens Ottomans ont été soumis en 1915. Je rejette cette injustice et, pour ma part, je compatis aux sentiments et à la souffrance de mes frères et sœurs arméniens. Je leur demande pardon ».

En deux semaines, environ 25 000 Turcs ont signé la pétition. Un tabou a été brisé. S’excuser auprès des Arméniens est devenu un sujet de discussion en Turquie.

La campagne a provoqué une riposte immédiate et violente des nationalistes en Turquie. Elle a aussi donné lieu à un grand nombre de discussions parmi les intellectuels progressistes, à la fois en public et en privé, au sujet des motifs de ceux qui ont déclenché la campagne et le texte des excuses.

Toutefois, il est indéniable que cette campagne d’excuses a été une étape importante. Beaucoup plus, à mon avis,  que la « Diplomatie-Football »

La campagne a essayé de faire quelque chose que la « Diplomatie Football » avait complètement négligée : signaler quelques-unes des causes profondes du conflit entre les Turcs et les Arméniens. En outre, alors que la « Diplomatie Football » était une affaire entre les gouvernements turc et arménien, les excuses étaient plus inclusives car elles s’adressaient à tous les Arméniens. En fait, la traduction en arménien des excuses, disponible sur le site web  http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com   était en arménien occidental, dialecte parlé par les Arméniens de la Diaspora.

La véritable transformation des relations arméno-turques ne peut pas avoir lieu sans impliquer tous les secteurs et niveaux des populations affectées. La « Diplomatie-Fooball » n’était pas un dialogue arméno-turc, comme elle a été présentée par les médias occidentaux ; c’était un dialogue améno-turc ignorant la grande Diaspora, qui comprend les descendants des survivants du Génocide arménien, chassés de leurs terres ancestrales et dispersés à travers le monde.

La campagne d’excuses a commencé à montrer les causes profondes de la question arméno-turque. Sans ces initiatives, la diplomatie traditionnelle résoud très peu, tardivement, et risque de ressembler à un simple maquillage sur un visage marqué de profondes cicatrices.

 http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article=48644

The year 2008 was eventful for Turkish-Armenian relations. Armenian President Serge Sarkisian invited his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul, to visit Armenia and watch the Armenia-Turkey World Cup qualifier soccer match. Both the Armenian and Turkish sides had given new momentum to behind-the-scenes meetings, which culminated in Gul’s acceptance of the invitation a few days before the match. On Sept. 6, Gul’s plane landed in Yerevan making him the first Turkish president to visit the capital.

When Sarkisian first extended the invitation, the media began referring to the ongoing Turkey-Armenia dialogue as “Soccer Diplomacy.” The exchange of ping-pong players in the early 1970’s between China and the U.S. paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, and was known as “Ping Pong Diplomacy.” The media was comparing the two, but the comparison is at best superficial. While such a term could be fitting to the rapprochement between two powerful countries like the U.S. and China, a similar description for Turkey and Armenia is misleading because it assumes that they are “competing” on a level playing field. Not only is there a glaring power asymmetry between Turkey and Armenia, but that power asymmetry is largely a result of the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians during World War I.

Which brings me to the campaign launched by 200 intellectuals in Turkey on December 15, apologizing for the Armenian Genocide.

The apology read: “My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them.”

Within two weeks, around 25,000 Turks had signed the petition. A taboo was broken. Apologizing from Armenians became a topic of discussion in Turkey.

The campaign saw an immediate and violent backlash from nationalists in Turkey. It also generated a great deal of discussion among progressive intellectuals, both in public and private, about the motives of the initiators of the campaign and the text of the apology.

Yet undeniably, the apology campaign was a milestone. More so than “Soccer Diplomacy,” I would argue.

The campaign attempted to do something “Soccer Diplomacy” had completely neglected: to address some of the root causes of the conflict between Turks and Armenians. Moreover, while “Soccer Diplomacy” was an affair between the Turkish and Armenian governments, the apology was more inclusive as it was addressed to all Armenians. In fact, the Armenian translation of the apology, made available on the website of the apology (http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com), was in Western Armenian—the dialect spoken by Diasporan Armenians.

The true transformation of Turkish-Armenian relations cannot take place without involving all sectors and levels of the affected populations. “Soccer Diplomacy” was not Turkish-Armenian dialogue, as it was portrayed in the Western media; it was Turkey-Armenia dialogue and ignored the large Diaspora, which is comprised of the descendents of survivors of the Armenian Genocide who were driven away from their ancestral lands and scattered around the world.

The apology campaign began addressing the root causes of the Turkish-Armenian issue. Without such initiatives, traditional diplomacy resolves too little, late, and risks looking like mere make-up on a deeply scarred face.

The Turkish version of this article appeared in Radikal, Turkey, on Jan. 26, 2009.

Radikal Yorum / 26/01/2009

2008,  Türk-Ermeni ilişkileri açısından oldukça hareketli bir yıl oldu. Ermenistan Devlet Başkanı Serj Sarkisyan, Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül’ü Dünya Kupası elemeleri çerçevesinde oynanacak Ermenistan-Türkiye maçını izlemek üzere Ermenistan’a davet etti. Gerek Ermeni, gerekse Türk tarafının perde arkasında yürüyen görüşmelere hız vermelerinin ardından süreç, Gül’ün maçın oynanmasına birkaç gün kala daveti kabul ettiğini bildirmesiyle sonuçlandı. Gül’ün 6 Eylül’de Erivan havaalanına inen uçağı, ilk kez bir Türk devlet başkanını Ermenistan başkentine getirmiş oluyordu.Sarkisyan davetini ilk kez dile getirdiğinde, medya Türkiye’yle Ermenistan arasındaki bu diyaloğa ‘Futbol Diplomasisi’ adını vermişti bile. Çin’le ABD arasında 1970’lerin başında başlayan pinpon maçları, Başkan Richard Nixon’un 1972’de Pekin’i ziyaretinin yolunu açmış ve bu süreç ‘Pinpon Diplomasisi’ diye adlandırılmıştı. Medya bu iki sürecin karşılaştırmasını yapıyordu, ama aslında bu karşılaştırma en azından oldukça yüzeyseldi. Söz konusu terim ABD ve Çin gibi iki güçlü ülke arasındaki yakınlaşmaya uysa da, Türkiye’yle Ermenistan için kullanıldığında, bu iki ülkeyi sanki eşit koşullarda ‘rekabet’ eden iki oyuncuymuş gibi sunduğundan, epeyce yanıltıcı oluyor. Türkiye’yle Ermenistan arasındaki asimetri yalnızca apaçık bir güç eşitsizliğinden değil, 1. Dünya Savaşı’nda Ermenilerin soykırıma uğratılmış olmasından da kaynaklanıyor.

Düşüncelerim tam da bu noktadan beni, Türkiye’nin 200 aydınının 15 Aralık’ta başlattığı Ermeni Soykırımı nedeniyle özür dileme kampanyasına götürüyor. Özür metni şöyle: “1915’te Osmanlı Ermenileri’nin maruz kaldığı Büyük Felâket’e duyarsız kalınmasını, bunun inkâr edilmesini vicdanım kabul etmiyor. Bu adaletsizliği reddediyor, kendi payıma Ermeni kardeşlerimin duygu ve acılarını paylaşıyor, onlardan özür diliyorum.” İki haftada 25 bin Türk bildiriyi imzaladı. Bir tabu kırıldı. Ermenilerden dilenen özür, Türkiye’de önemli bir gündem maddesi haline geldi. Kampanya anında milliyetçilerin şiddetli tepkisine hedef oldu. Ama ülkenin ilerici aydınları arasında da gerek kamuya açık, gerekse kendi aralarında, kampanyayı başlatanların amaçları ve metindeki sözcük seçimi üzerinden tartışmalara da yol açtı.

Bunlara rağmen özür kampanyası bir dönüm noktası oluşturdu – hem de bence ‘Futbol Diplomasisi’nden çok daha önemli bir dönüm noktası. Kampanya, ‘Futbol Diplomasisi’nin tümüyle gözardı ettiği bir şeyi yaptı: Türklerle Ermeniler arasındaki çatışmanın gerçek nedenlerini ele aldı. Dahası, ‘Futbol Diplomasisi’ Türkiye ve Ermenistan hükümetleri arasındaki ilişki üzerinden yürürken, özür kampanyası tüm Ermenilere hitap ettiğinden çok daha kapsayıcı. Metnin Ermenice çevirisi, kampanyanın internet sitesi’ne konuldu ve çeviri metin Diaspora Ermenilerinin kullandığı Batı Ermenicesi’yle yazıldı.

Türk-Ermeni ilişkilerinde gerçek bir dönüşüm ancak yaşananlardan etkilenen toplumların her düzeydeki tüm kesimlerini içine alan bir süreçle mümkün olabilir. ‘Futbol Diplomasisi’, Batı medyasında sunulduğunun tersine bir Türk-Ermeni diyaloğu değildi; Türkiye-Ermenistan diyaloğuydu ve Ermeni Soykırımı’ndan sağ kalanların, anayurtlarından sürülerek dünyanın dört yanına dağılmış olanların çocuklarının meydana getirdiği o geniş Diasporayı yok sayıyordu. Özür kampanyasıyla Türk-Ermeni ilişkileri sorununun temelindeki nedenler ilk kez ele alınıyor. Böylesi girişimler olmadan geleneksel diplomasi çok da işe yaramayacak, gecikmiş adımlar olarak kalacak ve derin yara izleri taşıyan bir yüze yapılmış makyaj olarak görülme riskini her zaman taşıyacak.

(ABD’de yayımlanan Armenian Weekly gazetesinin editörü, Radikal’e özel)

 http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=918637&Date=26.01.2009&CategoryID=99

From The Economist print edition

Hopes that a new channel may herald fresh reforms

ROJIN is a feisty, beautiful Kurdish bard who belts out nationalist ballads. As a result, private Kurdish television channels that showed her were long penalised or even taken off the air. But now she will be a regular on Turkey’s stultified TRT state television, which this week launched a 24-hour Kurdish channel in the main Kurdish dialect, Kurmanji.

A contradiction, yes. But it may just suggest that the Justice and Development (AK) party is regaining the reformist zeal that made it one of Turkey’s most popular and progressive governments. Kurdish hardliners scoff that the new channel is a cynical sop to the country’s 14m-odd Kurds before local elections in March. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AK prime minister, told an audience of Kurds in Diyarbakir in 2005 that the state had made mistakes in its treatment of the Kurds, his party won many a Kurdish heart (and vote). But it has lost them since he succumbed to the army’s demands to deal with Kurdish PKK rebels by force, not negotiation.

The army has been relentlessly pounding PKK guerrilla bases in northern Iraq. The PKK’s civilian arm, the Democratic Society Party, which has 20 elected parliamentarians, has been consistently snubbed by the AK government. Court cases bordering on the ludicrous continue against its members and against Kurdish-run municipalities that name their streets after eminent Kurds. One child in a Kurdish family from Germany was refused entry at the Turkish border recently because he had a Kurdish name.

Even radical Kurds express hope that the new television channel, however wimpish, may spell a new beginning. Indeed, they hope the AK will renew the reform promises that helped it to win re-election, with a bigger share of the vote, in July 2007. Mr Erdogan is expected to make a statement during the televised launch. Kurdish dissidents are due to host some of its shows. Whether it can compete with the PKK’s hugely popular satellite channel, Roj, is another question.

Private Kurdish television channels in Turkey are allowed to broadcast in their mother tongue for only four hours a week. Every show is vetted and has to have Turkish subtitles, making live programmes impossible. But the fact that Shivan Perwer, one of the most renowned Kurdish nationalist singers, is considering appearing on TRT’s Channel Six is being widely hailed as a breakthrough.

In another move, some 200 Turkish intellectuals have launched an internet petition about the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, saying that they are sorry. The text of their apology does not use the term genocide, favoured by Armenians. But at least 25,000 Turks, from many different walks of life, have signed the petition, prompting calls of treason by far-right nationalists. Mr Erdogan himself has called the petition “a mistake”. The country’s president, Abdullah Gul, who has spearheaded secret talks to normalise relations with Armenia, has been accused by an opposition parliamentarian of having Armenian ancestry. He took her to court, claiming his lineage was Turkish and Muslim to boot.

The petition’s signatories have also been assailed by many Armenians, who dismiss it as a ploy to get Barack Obama, who has used the G-word in the past, to drop it. Yet some are less recalcitrant. Khatchig Mouradian, a writer in the Armenian diaspora, says that “without such initiatives, traditional diplomacy resolves too little, late, and risks looking like mere make-up on a deeply scarred face.”

By Khatchig Mouradian

On December 15, around 200 intellectuals in Turkey launched an Internet petition1 apologizing for the Armenian Genocide. Soon thereafter, hell broke loose.

Although there is a wide consensus among genocide and Holocaust scholars that the Armenian Genocide took place, the Turkish state continues to vehemently deny that a state-sponsored campaign took the lives of approximately 1.5 million Armenians during World War I. The Armenians, the official Turkish argument goes, were victims of ethnic strife, or war and starvation, just like many Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. Turkey invests millions of dollars in the United States to lobby against resolutions recognizing the Armenian Genocide and to produce denialist literature. Moreover, many Turkish intellectual who have spoken against the denial have been charged for “insulting Turkishness” under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code.

The fact that the text of the apology2 didn’t employ the term “genocide” but opted for “Great Catastrophe” did not stave off condemnation. A barrage of criticism and attacks followed almost immediately. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish army, many members of the parliament, and practically the entire Turkish establishment instigated and encouraged a public outcry against the apology. Threats and insults flew from left and right, and counter-petitions were launched from Turks demanding the Armenians to apologize.

Yet despite the wave of condemnation, thousands of ordinary Turks from all walks of life added their names to the petition. After breaking the taboo against talking about the Armenian Genocide, Turkish scholars, writers and journalists had made apologizing for the Armenian Genocide an issue of public discourse. The petition did not simply recognize the suffering of the Armenians; rather, it went beyond and offered an apology, which was crucial for the initiators of the campaign. “I think two words moved the people: Ozur Dileriz (‘We apologize’),” said the drafter of the petition, Prof. Baskin Oran when I asked him about the wording of the petition. “These are the very two words that kept thousands of Turks from signing it. But they were imperative. I don’t feel responsible for the butchery done by the Ittihadists [the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the organizers of the Genocide] but we had to say these words. There is something called a ‘collective conscience,’” he added.

Some criticized the text because it avoided using the term “genocide.” The former head of the Istanbul branch of the Human Rights Association, lawyer Eren Keskin, said, “I do not accept compromise when it comes to the use of the term genocide. Even though the word genocide was not used in the petition, I signed it, because I believe any change in a country or in a system can take place if there is an ‘internal’ demand. I believe that the Republic of Turkey is a continuation of the Ittihadist tradition—the tradition of the perpetrators of the Genocide. The majority of the founding members of the Turkish Republic, including the leaders, were members of the CUP.” An apology is an obligation, Keskin told me. “Just as the Republic of Turkey took over the financial obligations of the Ottomans under the Lausanne Treaty, it should take over the obligation to apologize for the Genocide. I believe it is first and foremost the obligation of the Republic of Turkey to apologize. The individuals who internalize the official ideology, who do not question it, who ignore the fact that a genocide has been committed and who give their approval by remaining silent also owe an apology to Armenians,” she said. “I signed the statement because I think this is an initiative that will normalize, in the eyes of the Turkish public, the concept of and the obligation to apologize to Armenians.”

Amberin Zaman, Turkey’s correspondent for The Economist and a columnist for the Turkish newspaper Taraf, said that regardless of the criticism about the wording, the petition initiative was a turning point. “When we look back at this campaign several years from now, I think there can be no doubt that it will be viewed as a turning point—not just for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation, but more importantly in terms of getting modern Turkey to come to terms with one of the darkest chapters of its recent past,” she said. “Whether people agree, condemn or quibble with the wording of the text, in the end [the petition] has unleashed an unprecedented debate about the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. It has also sent a very strong signal that rapprochement efforts between our mutual governments [Armenia and Turkey] is far surpassed by the very real desire at a societal level to heal the wounds and move on,” she added. “The genie is now well and truly out of the bottle.”

Poet Ron Margulies considers the petition a first step. “It does something which should have been done decades ago and tells Armenians that many Turks share and understand their pain, sorrow and grief. This apology and expression of empathy is the first step without which nothing else can follow,” he said. “But there is also a second reason which, for me, is as important as the first, and it has to do with Turkish politics rather than the Armenian issue in particular. In recent years, many unmentionables have become mentionable and are frequently mentioned in Turkey. These include the existence and rights of the Kurds, the issue of the other minorities, the role of the armed forces in the political life of the country, the competence of the armed forces and of the chiefs of staff, the issue of Islam, the right to wear a headscarf in public offices, etc. Once out of the bottle, these genies refuse to go back in. And they all deal serious blows to Kemalism, to nationalism, to the official ideology of the Turkish state. This petition, and the fact that 8,000 people signed it within the first day-and-a-half, is another such blow. We must continue raining blows on the edifice of the Kemalist state,” he added.

For these reasons, Margulies notes, the wording of the petition was not so important to him. “Every text can be improved upon. But that is not the point. The petition has already had a phenomenal impact—because of its content and its spirit, not because of the specific wording,” he explained.

When I asked why she signed the petition, author and journalist Ece Temelkuran spoke about the massacres, but more importantly, about the dispossession. “Since writing my book [The Deep Mountain], the conflict, which was already profoundly emotional for most of us after [Turkish-Armenian journalist] Hrant Dink’s death, became a personal issue to me. The petition was a way of telling my Armenian friends that I share their long lasting pain and that I understand. As far as I observed among the Armenians in the Diaspora and in Armenia, the deepest and the most vital pain is the homelessness they feel. Besides the pain of being massacred, Armenians today, all over the world, feel homeless. With the petition, I just wanted to tell the Armenians that people still living in Anatolia didn’t forget what happened and that they still feel the absence of their Armenian brothers and sisters.”

1 http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com

2 The apology read: “My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them.”

——————————————————————————–

From: Z Net – The Spirit Of Resistance Lives

URL: http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/20064

Haigazian’s Student Life Director and Haigazian Armenological Review’s executive secretary Antranig Dakessian spoke briefly about the current developments in Turkish-Armenian relations and introduced the speaker, Khatchig Mouradian, editor of the Boston-based Armenian Weekly and a graduate of Haigazian University.

Mouradian first provided the context in which the recent Turkey-Armenia rapprochement happened. During the Russia-Georgia conflict, he noted, traffic was disrupted on an important highway connecting the two countries, stopping vital supplies from reaching Armenia. With the Russia-Georgia standoff unresolved, urgent attention was given in Yerevan to the Turkey-Armenia border, closed by Turkey when the Karabagh conflict erupted. Mouradian also talked about the presidential election in Armenia and how it affected the rapprochement.

The speaker then detailed the political situation in Turkey and the reasons behind Ankara’s interest in reaching a breakthrough in Turkey-Armenia relations. After a brief overview of the situation in Turkey, during which he spoke about the role of the Turkish army and bureaucracy and the difficult situation the ruling AK party has found itself in, Mouradian noted that Turkey’s interest in a breakthrough could be summarized by one word: genocide.

“With a democratic majority in Congress, and with the prospects of an Obama/Biden victory high, Turkey realized that it is only a matter of time before the U.S. officially recognizes the Armenian genocide,” Mouradian said.

Mouradian said, “In Turkey, the hardliners argued that Ankara should avoid normalizing relations with Yerevan before the latter stop pursuing international recognition of the Genocide and withdraws forces from Karabagh. The moderates, on the other hand, argued that the best strategy for Turkey would be to disrupt the harmony between the Armenian state, which has made genocide recognition a foreign relations priority, and the Armenian Diaspora, which has been pursuing genocide recognition worldwide for decades through activism and lobbying.” By starting negotiations with Armenia and receiving concessions from it on the genocide recognition front, Mouradian argued, Turkey hoped of creating a schism between the Diaspora and Armenia and undermine the passage of the Genocide Resolution in the U.S.

Mouradian then talked about the inherent asymmetries in the Turkey-Armenia dialogue. He said, “True transformation of Turkish-Armenian relations cannot take place without involving all sectors and levels of the affected population. ‘Soccer Diplomacy’ was not Turkish-Armenian dialogue—as it was portrayed in the media—it was Turkey-Armenia dialogue and ignored the large and powerful Diaspora that has been the coronary artery of Armenia since its independence.”

He concluded, “A great amount of creativity is necessary to address the power asymmetries that are so inherent to this conflict—especially since these asymmetries are the product of the genocide perpetrated by one side and the denial and hostile attitude that continued to define the policies of that side towards the other.”

The Armenian Weekly
Dec. 20, 2008

The selection of Rahm Emanuel as chief of staff—the first major appointment by President-elect Barack Obama—did not fare well with many Armenian-Americans who supported the Illinois Senator’s bid for presidency. While the Armenian-Americans who overwhelmingly voted for Obama showed signs of unease, those who supported the McCain-Palin ticket were quick to exclaim, I told you so!

The concerns of Armenian-Americans are understandable. Beginning with his days in the Clinton Administration through his years in Congress, Emanuel’s support has been mixed. It appears—if we are to take Robert Novak’s word for it—Emanuel opposed Clinton Administration affirmation of the Armenian Genocide. And yet, in his first term in Congress in 2003, he cosponsored Armenian Genocide legislation (H.Res.193) and urged President Bush in 2003, 2004 and 2005 to properly characterize the events from 1915-1923 as genocide.

Back then, Emanuel wasn’t afraid to question U.S. assistance to Turkey. In fact, in February 2003, when Congress was considering a $24 billion aid package to Turkey in return for allowing U.S. troops to open up a northern front to battle Iraqi insurgents, Emanuel was positively poetic in listing the myriad of domestic uses for those funds—from “no child left behind programs,” to college tuition assistance. Turkey eventually blocked U.S. troops from setting up the northern front.

Since 2006, it appears Emanuel has gone back to his Clinton-Administration days, counseling Speaker Pelosi not to place the Armenian Genocide resolution on the House agenda—advice that Pelosi and the House leadership did not heed.

So, again, that Armenian-Americans are concerned is understandable. What is not understandable, however, is the leap that many Armenian-Americans are making—concluding that the appointment of Emanuel is proof that Obama is somehow on the road to reneging on his election pledge even before taking his oath of office.

Such thinking comes off to be a bit naive. If the criteria for appointing a presidential chief of staff were for him to agree with the President on every single issue, no one would ever serve in that post. The President will have points of agreement and disagreement with his chief of staff—and all members of his Administration, for that matter—with the final word being that of the President, himself. Not to mention the fact that it is foolhardy to think that the President’s choice of a chief of staff would be decided on a single human rights issue—however just.

Armenian-American critics of the Emanuel pick ought to keep in mind the impressive record of President-elect Obama and—perhaps even more importantly—that of vice President-elect Biden, when it comes to issues of concern to Armenian-Americans. Although their record does not guarantee their support of Genocide recognition now that they have assumed the highest office of the country, it should, at least, make one think twice before jumping to conclusions.

Concentrating on the Emanuel pick is a distraction. Regardless of who the chief of staff is, immense pressure is going to be exerted on Obama—by some Washington elites, the Turkish state and U.S.-based lobby groups working openly or silently for the Turkish government—to dissuade him from recognizing the Armenian Genocide.

Given that reality, Armenian-Americans have two clear choices. To sit on their hands, thinking that they already did their part by voting for Obama and now it is his turn to deliver, or to struggle more fiercely than ever for truth and justice, knowing well that they have in the highest office of their country, a President who understands their struggle for truth and justice—certainly more than his predecessors.

The Armenian Weekly
Nov. 15, 2008

http://www.hairenik.com/armenianweekly/com11150801.htm

Years from now, you will remember Nov. 4, 2008 as the day on which the final dash to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide began in this country.

Or you will remember it as yet another election day, when yet another president was elected, but despite all hopes, efforts and promises, little changed.

And it won’t be President Barack Obama alone who will determine the road taken.

It will also be you.

Do not say, I supported Barack Obama during the elections, I canvassed for him, I made phone calls, I knocked on doors, I voted for him, and now, it is his turn.

“I’m asking you to believe. Not just in my ability to bring about real change to Washington… I’m asking you to believe in yours,” said your President.

And today, before asking him to bring about real change, believe in your ability to do so.

And get to work.

Because the enemies of truth, the adversaries of justice, the masters of the status quo, and those who are on the payroll of denial and falsification will continue working against you in full-force.

But do not forget that the Armenian issue started in Turkey, and that’s where it will be resolved. Do not forget that the ashes of the victims, scattered across Anatolia and the deserts of Syria, will not find peace even if all countries recognize their suffering.

Their souls will rest only when Turkey itself recognizes the genocide.

Their souls will rest only when Turkey adorns its cities with memorials for the victims and with statues of Siamanto and Varoujan.

And only when the songs of Komitas echo again in the cities and villages of Anatolia.

Do not forget that all your activism here in the U.S. is just a means to exert pressure on the Turkish state and help educate the public.

It is not an end in itself.

Do not forget that, even when your President acknowledges the Armenian Genocide, you will still have a long way to go.

You will still have to struggle and educate. You will still have millions of hearts and mind to win over; the hearts and minds of the people who inherited—willingly or not—the legacy of a genocidal regime.

And, most importantly, do not be discouraged by the pronouncements of those who think they can resolve today or tomorrow the problems between the Turkish state and the Armenians.

The road to truth and justice is a long one.

It did not start with you. And it will not necessarily end in your day.

But it sure requires your dedication.

So roll up your sleeves and get to work.

If you struggle tirelessly, your efforts will bear fruit: Your President, your representatives and your fellow citizens will join hands with you.

And when you succeed in bringing about change in your country, remember that you generation is not the sole victor.

That victory belongs to all the survivors of the Genocide as well as their descendents, who continued to believe in truth and justice.

So when your activism finally brings about the recognition we all would like to see in this country, before the fireworks and celebrations, light a candle in memory of those victims and survivors.

And never forget that you will not have honored the victims of Turkey in 1915, if you do not struggle to end genocides everywhere and at all times.

Now—more than ever before—is your time to effect change.

And, yes, you can.

Nov. 4, 2008
Boston, Mass.

http://www.hairenik.com/armenianweekly/com11080802.htm

August 16, 2008

By Khatchig Mouradian
and Ronald Suny

Khatchig Mouradian’s ZSpace Page

Ronald Grigor Suny is professor of social and political history at the University of Michigan and professor emeritus of political science and history at the University of Chicago.

He is the author of The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton University Press, 1972); Armenia in the Twentieth Century (Scholars Press, 1983); The Making of the Georgian Nation (Indiana University Press, 1988, 1994); Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Indiana University Press, 1993); The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford University Press, 1993); and The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (Oxford University Press, 1998).

***

Khatchig Mouradian—Talk about how the mainstream media in the U.S. is covering the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

Ronald Suny—The mainstream media is completely off the wall. It’s echoing the line of the president, the government, and the presidential candidates. Also, in trying to make sense of the conflict, the mainstream media is using frames like “Russian imperialism” and “Russian aggression.” These are old, cold-war era frames that they are reproducing and the result is a complete misreading of the situation.

After various developments in early 1990′s and by international agreement, Russia took up the role of peacekeeper, separating the Georgians from the Abkhaz and the Ossetians. It has kept its role relatively responsibly and maintained peace in the area. Of course, it is correct to say in some abstract way that Russia is not observing the territorial integrity of Georgia or that Russia is attacking a sovereign democratic country, but all this misses the whole point that Russia has been involved in peacekeeping in those areas for years.

This particular crisis began with [Georgian president Mikhail] Saakashvilli. He launched a rocket attack against Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The attack came at a very strategic point, when Bush and Putin were in Beijing and [Russian president Dmitry] Medvedev was on a cruise on the Volga. Important details such as these are left out of many reports.

The mainstream media is talking about empire and imperialism. But what Russia is practicing is, in fact, hegemony. It wants to dominate its near abroad, just like the U.S. wants to dominate Latin America—although the Americans also seek global hegemony.

The Russians want to preserve the status quo. They want to keep Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a kind of frozen conflict situation. That works for them. They can irritate Tbilisi, keep Georgia from integrating fully with the West, and try to prevent it from entering NATO. For the Russians, Georgia’s membership to the military alliance spells disaster. Baltic countries, many Eastern European countries, and Turkey are in NATO. If you add Georgia, the entire western and southern borders Russia would be with NATO member countries. This is unacceptable for a great power like Russia.

K.M.—How do you explain Russia’s response to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia?

R.S.—In the last 15 years, Russia has suffered humiliation after humiliation. The breakup of the Soviet Union was not popular in Russia, except among some liberals—and liberal in Russia means right-winger, traitor. The U.S. had promised not to expand NATO to Eastern Europe but has done it. In turn, the so-called “colored revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan frightened the Russians. They read these revolutions as Western interference, artificial events conjured up by the West to push forward anti-Russian elements like Saakashvili and [Ukranian president Victor] Yushchenko. Then Kosovo gained independence despite Moscow’s objections.
After this colossal sense of humiliation, of a loss of power, [former Russian president and current Prime Minister] Vladimir Putin comes along, oil prices shoot up, and the Russians are making money, the country is growing, and they begin to flex their muscles again. If you listen to the Russian rhetoric now, it is about how after years of humiliation, they are back and they are no longer going to be pushed around.

K.M.—How far do you think Putin will go after this show of force?

R.S.—I think the Russians made their point. Confrontation is not their first choice. They have too much going with the international community to want to go back behind some kind of Iron Curtain. They don’t want to be isolated.

K.M.—What do you think about the West’s response?

R.S.—I don’t think it’s an accident that [French president Nicolas] Sarkozy, [German Chancellor Angela] Merkel, and other European leaders and diplomats are flocking to Moscow and trying to resolve this issue. The Europeans see Russia as a part of Europe. And they are not taking as hard a line as the Bush Administration.

I have to note that the Bush Administration was very influenced by [vice president Dick] Cheney. The first statement that President Bush made was not particularly strong, but later, he and the government adopted the Cheney line.

But the U.S. and NATO are powerless in this situation. They’re obviously not going to go to war over South Ossetia. They don’t have much maneuverability. Saakashvili started this, but it’s the Russians that took it up and have improved their position.

The only thing that Saakashvili and the West can try to do now is discredit Russia. They’re going to play that card, of course. They’re going to make Russia look like the aggressor. And, of course, the Russians play into this image. They brutalize. Why did they bomb the Georgian city of Gori? They wanted to punish the Georgians. They wanted to teach them a lesson. And I think they have. I predict that Saakashvili’s days in power are numbered. What was he thinking? He’s a very impetuous leader. People in Georgia are afraid of him because they never know what to expect. He gambled and he lost this gamble. When you don’t win a war that you initiate—as the Israeli leaders have learned in Lebanon, and the U.S has learned in Iraq—then you pay for it.

K.M.—What has changed in the equation after the war between Georgia and Russia?

R.S.—Small as it seems to be, the tiny little place that few have ever heard of—South Ossetia—in fact has changed the nature of the post-Soviet world. Now countries have learned not to muck around with the Russians.  They have always been a hard country to bargain with. Now they’re saying: if you push us hard enough, we’ll also use military power. That’s a new dimension.

K.M.—Talk about the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

R.S.—In Soviet times, South Ossetia was an autonomous district and Abkhazia was an autonomous Soviet republic. They had this official autonomy, but in fact they were dominated completely by Georgia, particularly during the Stalin period, when [Stalin's secret police boss Lavrenty] Beria was close to Stalin. Much resentment developed. There was a kind of Georgianization that took place in those regions.

When the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, a very radical nationalist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was elected president in Georgia. He declared “Georgia for the Georgians.” They were going to have an ethno-national republic, and the other peoples, who were 30 percent of the population (hundreds of thousands of Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Muslim Georgians, and, of course, Abkhazians and Ossetians), did not figure in their vision. The Abkhazians and Ossetians rebelled and, with Russian help, declared their autonomy and drove the Georgians out. There are hundreds of thousands of Georgian refugees from those areas now in Georgia. Roughly around 1993-94, around the time the Russians were negotiating the armistice in Nagorno-Karabagh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, they also negotiated a similar armistice in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Ossetians and Abkhazians want to be in Russia or independent. Russia never wanted to annex them and bring them fully to Russia because of the international law of territorial integrity. Russia’s position is that you can’t alter borders without mutual agreement. (In other words, they are against the independence of Kosovo for good reason, because that would then justify Chechnya’s revolt). The Russians have held that principle, but when the U.S. backed Kosovo’s independence, Putin remarked that if Kosovo can do it, why not Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well?

Unlike Karabagh, where Armenians were an overwhelming majority—they were about 76 percent in 1989 when the conflict broke—in Abkhazia, the Abkhaz were only 17 percent of the population and Georgians were something like 43 percent. (By the way, according to most accounts, the Armenians may be the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia today).

K.M.—In your book The Making of the Georgian Nation, you say, “If there is any conclusion to be derived from such a study of the longue duree of a small nation, it might be that a nation is never fully ‘made.’ It is always in the process of being made.” How do you think the current conflict will affect the making of the Georgian nation?

R.S.—In their own discourse, the Georgians blame everything on foreigners, the Russians, or minorities. They don’t recognize their own responsibility for their own fate. Basically, in some ways, the Georgian state committed suicide by this fierce policy both towards Russia and its own minorities. The Georgians had to make a choice: do they try to regain and solidify, consolidate Georgian national territory with a hard militaristic confrontational policy that is essentially anti-Russian, pro-West? Or do they try to negotiate, grant concessions, offer high degrees of autonomy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and also try a more cooperative approach towards Russia? Georgia has alternated between these choices. The problem is, they don’t get much from the cooperative approach and they get frustrated with that.

Saakashvili has taken a harder line. He’s figuring, “I can put Russia in a very difficult position. I can use the West and maybe that kind of pressure will both force Russia to come to some kind of agreement with me and also help me get into NATO.” That was his gamble.

K.M.—Georgia’s neighbor, Azerbaijan, welcomed Tbilisi’s move to regain control of South Ossetia and signaled the possibility of a similar action against its own breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabagh. Do you think Azerbaijani officials will act on their war talk?

R.S.—Russia’s actions are changing things. Had Saakashvili succeeded, then Azerbaijan would have been more encouraged to try to do something in Karabakh on its own. If I were Azerbaijan, I’d be very wary. The events in Georgia have shaken things up.  Russia is once again the major player in the South Caucasus, and it considers Armenia to be its closest ally in the region.

http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/18457

The Armenian Weekly
April 5, 2008

NEW YORK (A.W.)—Nicholas Kristof has been an Op-Ed columnist for the New York Times since November 2001. In his weekly columns, he often tackles issues of human rights abuses and genocide, and has been instrumental in creating awareness on the situation in Darfur.

Nicholas Donabet Kristof is the son of Ladis Kristof, a Transylvanian-born Armenian who immigrated to the United States after World War II.

In this interview, conducted in his office at the New York Times on March 28, we talk about the genocide in Darfur.

***

Khatchig Mouradian—You’ve been covering the genocide in Darfur for four years now. What has changed over this time in both public awareness and the situation on the ground?

Nicholas Kristof—There’s certainly more attention to Darfur now. And it really is heartening, for example, how many university students all across the country have been willing to campaign for Darfur. So in my more hopeful moments, I think about the hundreds of thousands of college students who are protesting on behalf of people of a different religion, different skin color, who they will never meet, and I think, “Wow, we are really making some progress.”

But then at the end of the day, on the ground in Darfur, the situation is as messy now as it was four years ago. If you had told me four years ago when I first went there that in 2008, people would know what Darfur is, they would know what is going on there, that the president would have called it “genocide,” I would have been surprised. But if you told me that people would know what’s going on and yet still we wouldn’t do anything, then I would have been even more stunned and depressed.

K.M.—In the past, governments were careful not to invoke the term “genocide” because then they would have to act. Now, President Bush used the word when referring to Darfur, but nothing happened. Has the word “genocide” lost its meaning?

N.K.—I don’t think it ever really had a lot of meaning to inspire action. However, it does make people feel guilty. The reason you do have a lot of people protesting on behalf of Darfur is the word “genocide.” If you use the word “ethnic cleansing,” I don’t think it gets people so upset.

Look at how in the Congo the death toll has been much greater, but it’s not really a case of genocide; it’s a messy difficult case of rival militias and that has attracted much less attention than Darfur. What has made a difference is that in Darfur the death toll is smaller, but it is genocide. So I do think that genocide as a reality and as a term does make a difference—but just not nearly enough.

K.M.—In your columns, you’ve mentioned that you’ve received emails from people saying, Yes, the situation in Darfur is bad, but we have other priorities. How do you feel about this kind of reaction, be it from ordinary people or government officials?

N.K.—I think that one of the basic mistakes that Western governments make is that while they think that it’s unfortunate what is happening in Darfur, that there are a lot of unfortunate things going on in a lot of places around the world. And Darfur is their number 38th priority.

In fact, I think it’s one of the lessons of history that over time genocide really does rise to the very top of the priority list. The Armenian genocide is a perfect example of that. When it was going on, the Wilson administration certainly thought that it was unfortunate; they didn’t want Armenians killed, but they had huge challenges with Europe, with the Ottoman Empire, and so it just never rose very high on the priority list. The same is true with the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Yet, each of those has had a staying power, a resonance throughout history precisely because it was genocide. I think that the mistake that the administration has made, the State Department has made, and a lot of us in the media have made is that we don’t appreciate that there really is something different about a government choosing a people based on race, color, religion, or whatever, and deciding to kill them.

K.M.—Do you think there will be any drastic changes in the U.S. policy on Darfur when there’s a new president in the Oval Office next year?

N.K.—There is some reason to believe that the next president will be modestly more active on Darfur. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have both been very active on the issue. John McCain had been earlier on; he has slowed down a little bit on Darfur more recently. But all of them have been, at one time or the other, real leaders on it. So yes, there is hope that if they were in the White House, they would be more active on it.

But at the end of the day, I think that one of the things we see from history is that the president is never going to really lead in a case of genocide because there tends not to be a national interest involved, and there tends to be a lot of uncertainty about the right thing to do, and there are a lot of other priorities. When there has been some kind of response, it has been because you just had a lot of Americans shaming their president to act. Kosovo is a good example of that. There, we had the Clinton administration that really didn’t want to do very much, but they had just been tormented over a combination of Rwanda and Bosnia and, finally, they felt they had to do something and they did the right thing. Ultimately, I think it is going to be the same in the case of Darfur. The shaming of the U.S., Europe, China is going to actually make a difference.

K.M.—So you believe that the movement to change the situation is going to be from the bottom-up…

N.K.—It would be great if there were more change at the top, but the reality is that Mia Farrow has done more good for the people of Darfur diplomatically than Condi Rice has. And to the extent that China is now paying attention to Darfur, and is being somewhat helpful, that’s really because of Mia Farrow, not because of Condi Rice.

That said, I hope that we’re going to see more rigorous action by government officials, and Sarcozy, I think, is going to be more helpful in Chad especially. But fundamentally, political leaders are going to be reactive rather than proactive. So it’s going to be the grassroots activists who are going to be the ones bringing about that change, whether it’s in our government or in the Chinese government.

K.M.—What are your thoughts about the way Muslim countries have been reacting to the crisis in Darfur? They point out the double standards of the U.S., but they also uphold similar double standards by speaking about human rights violations in Israel and the Palestinian territories, while ignoring the genocide in Darfur.

N.K.—Everybody has double standards and we always tend to be more shocked about everybody else’s double standards. Look at Zimbabwe, for example. The world was horrified when you had white Rhodesians doing terrible things to blacks there, but when it’s Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe, then it tends to be more accepted by everybody. Likewise, Sudan can get away with doing things to its own people that no outsider could get away with.

I do think that there have been double standards in the Egyptian news media, in particular. I really had hoped that the Egyptian news media, because it’s so important in the region, could have done more with Darfur. Instead, there is this reflexive sense that those Yankee imperialists went after Iraqi oil and neutralized Iraq on behalf of Israel and now they’re going to do the same thing to Sudan. I think that’s very unfortunate, but, I must say, we suffer from double standards all the time as well.

K.M.—And U.S. foreign policy in recent years has aggravated the situation…

N.K.—Absolutely. I think that our Middle Eastern policy—the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq—has left us in a situation where everything we do is viewed through an incredible prism of suspicion. That makes it very difficult for us to do anything about an Arab country, especially an Arab country with oil. This is one reason why it would be so helpful if we worked more with European countries and Muslim countries. If Egypt, the Arab League, or other Muslim countries outside the Arab world were to be more concerned about Muslims being slaughtered in Darfur, that would be of huge help.

K.M.—How does this affect you on a personal level? Isn’t it very frustrating to see how slowly things change—if they ever do?

N.K.—Absolutely. And the most frustrating is the difficulty translating from concern to actually any kind of positive action. I find that incredibly frustrating. I’m quite worried that the next issue is going to be the North-South war in Sudan. And Darfur might just be remembered as the prologue to something much bloodier…

One of the lessons that we should have learned is that you can intervene much more easily early on in a conflict. Once Humpty Dumpty has fallen off the wall, then it’s impossible to put him back together again. Right now, everybody is watching south Sudan fall off the ledge. We can still do something, but a year from now it may be utterly too late.

K.M.—What do you usually tell people who ask what they can do to help?

N.K.—Some of the websites that I recommend people to go to are Save Darfur (www.Save Darfur.org), the Genocide Intervention Network (www.genocide intervention.net) and Dream for Darfur (www.dreamfordarfur.org).

I do think that the Armenian community has some special responsibility to lead the way. One of the ways of memorializing the Armenian genocide should be to prevent the next genocide from happening…

K.M.—Just like the role the Jewish community is playing…

N.K.—Exactly. I think those websites are a good place to start, and some combination of calling the White House and writing member of Congress. There’s a website called Darfurscores.org that shows how each member of Congress has done. I think letters to other governments are helpful, too.

K.M.—What about the humanitarian aspect of all this?

N.K.—Early on, when people asked me what they could do to help, I would point them to specific humanitarian organizations like Doctors Without Borders (www.doctorswithoutborders.org). I think they do great work and if one donates to them, that’s not money wasted at all.

But for four years now I’ve been going and I’ve seen doctors bandage up kids with bullet wounds. That can keep on going for 20 years. So at some point, you begin to think that the real response is not a lot more bandages and more surgeons, but to do something to actually stop the killing. And so for that reason, now when people ask, I tend to emphasize the advocacy organizations.

http://www.hairenik.com/armenianweekly/fea04050802p.htm